This Thought Experiment is a scenario-based exercise designed to provoke discussion. It is not a prediction or statement of fact.
Imagine a regulator that stopped asking whether a deposit limit is offered and started asking what happened to the people who set one. Every large online market now makes operators put limit-setting tools in front of customers, and almost none of them make the operator show that those tools change deposits, losses or time played. Great Britain sits closest to that line, because it already compels operators to evaluate whether their own interventions work while asking nothing equivalent of the tools the customer operates, and the second phase of its new deposit limit rules applies from 30 September 2026 with no effectiveness test attached to it. What follows works through what an outcome test would demand, which markets are nearest to imposing one, and what an operator would need to be holding in order to pass.
Key Takeaways
- Great Britain already requires licensees to evaluate whether their own interventions change behaviour, under paragraphs 12 and 13 of social responsibility code provision 3.4.3, which have been in force since 12 September 2022 and oblige an operator to measure the impact of its interactions and demonstrate the outcomes to the Gambling Commission.
- No equivalent duty attaches to the tools the customer sets. On deposit limits the Commission’s published position is that it encourages operators to monitor engagement with prompts and alerts, and the second phase of RTS 12 applies from 30 September 2026 after being put back from 30 June 2026.
- Where limits are mandatory and the regulator frames them, measured change exists. The Kansspelautoriteit recorded average monthly loss per account falling 31%, from €116 to €80, and accounts losing more than €1,000 a month falling from 3.9% to 0.9%, after the Dutch rules of 1 October 2024.
- Where limits are voluntary and self-set, the evidence is mostly self-report. A Gambling Commission survey found 25% of British gamblers had ever used a financial limit of any kind, and only 43% correctly understood what a net deposit limit was. Germany’s whole online regime faces a statutory evaluation due by 31 December 2026 under section 32 of the 2021 Interstate Treaty.
1. What would an outcome test actually require?
An outcome test would require the operator to show, in its own data, what changed for the customers who used a tool against what happened to similar customers who did not. That is four numbers rather than one: how many customers set the tool, what their deposits, net losses and session time did over a defined window afterwards, how that compares with a matched group, and how long the change held before the limit was raised again.
Half of this is already law in Great Britain, which is the part that tends to get missed. Paragraph 12 of social responsibility code provision 3.4.3 requires licensees to implement processes to understand the impact of individual interactions and actions on a customer’s behaviour, and paragraph 13 requires them to take all reasonable steps to evaluate the effectiveness of their overall approach, for example by trialling and measuring impact, and to be able to demonstrate the outcomes to the Commission.[1] Both paragraphs have been in force since 12 September 2022, and the Commission’s formal guidance under that provision treats a reduction in indicators of harm following action as the thing being measured.[2]
The duty stops at the operator’s own interventions. For the tools the customer sets, the Commission’s published position is that it encourages operators to monitor engagement with any prompts or alerts to understand their effectiveness.[3] Encouragement is not a licence condition, and nobody has ever been sanctioned for failing to do something they were encouraged to do.
What arrives on 30 September 2026 is a definition rather than a test. From that date a British licensee must offer a gross deposit limit, may only use the words deposit limit for a gross limit, must give it at least the same prominence as any other financial limit, and must offer fixed 24-hour, seven-day and one-month timeframes, with the most restrictive limit applying where a customer has set several.[4] The date moved once already, from 30 June 2026, after operators asked for more technical development time.[5]
2. Which markets are closest to requiring proof?
Germany and Australia are closest, and in both the obligation to produce proof sits on the regime rather than on the individual operator. Section 32 of the 2021 Interstate Treaty requires the German states to evaluate the effects of the treaty, with the summary report due by 31 December 2026 and every five years after that.[6] Australia built its evaluation before the rules, commissioning a baseline study of more than 5,000 online wagerers ahead of the ten measures in the National Consumer Protection Framework and designing the assessment as four phases over five years.[7]
| Market | The main limit rule | Who sets the number | Is proof of effect required? |
| Great Britain | RTS 12: gross deposit limits offered with at least equal prominence, limit-setting as the default choice, six-monthly review prompts, fully in force 30 September 2026 | The customer | Yes for operator-led customer interactions under SR code 3.4.3 paragraphs 12 and 13. No for customer-led tools, where monitoring is encouraged only |
| Netherlands | Limits set at registration, with operator contact required above €350 a month, or €150 for players aged 18 to 24, in force since 1 October 2024 | The customer, inside a frame the regulator sets | Not on the operator. The Kansspelautoriteit measures outcomes from licensee data itself and publishes them |
| Germany | Cross-operator deposit limit of €1,000 a month under the 2021 Interstate Treaty, enforced through a central limit file | The state, with the player free to set a lower figure | Yes, at regime level. Section 32 requires a summary evaluation report by 31 December 2026 and every five years after |
| Australia | Ten measures in the National Consumer Protection Framework, including voluntary deposit limits and activity statements | The customer | Yes, at framework level. A baseline study was published in November 2019 and the evaluation was designed as four phases over five years |
Germany is the one to watch. The expert council advising the states has already recorded in the interim evaluation that the €1,000 cross-operator monthly ceiling is far too high against what is known about the spending of people with a gambling disorder.[6] A statutory evaluation reporting in December 2026, into an argument that is already running, is how a limit gets moved.
3. What does the evidence show right now?
It shows a gap between what regulators measure in account data and what players say about themselves, and the gap is wide enough to decide the argument either way.
The Dutch account data is the strongest evidence that limits move behaviour. In its second measurement of the rules that took effect on 1 October 2024, drawn from pseudonymised data supplied by 29 licensed providers, the Kansspelautoriteit found average monthly loss per account down 31%, from €116 to €80, across two eight-month periods, accounts losing more than €1,000 a month down from 3.9% to 0.9%, and the share of players breaching the net deposit thresholds down from 9.7% before October 2024 to 2.2% by March 2025.[8] Gross gambling revenue fell 15% by May 2025 against September 2024, and 93% of players used only licensed sites in the first quarter of 2025, while monthly searches for illegal sites rose 23%, from 765,000 to 941,000.[8]
The Dutch survey data points the other way. Research carried out by Ipsos I&O for the justice ministry’s research centre, published on 17 December 2025, found that 40% of players credited the money limits with helping them spend less and 30% said the time limits helped them play for less time, while support for mandatory limits rose from 76% in 2023 to 82% in 2025.[9] Among players with no problem indicators, 74% said their own self-control made limits unnecessary, against 43% to 45% of moderate and high risk players.[9]
British evidence is thinner and almost entirely self-reported. A survey of 1,019 people who had gambled in the previous year, run for the Gambling Commission by Yonder and published on 4 February 2025, found that 25% had ever used a financial limit of any kind, and that of the 325 who had, 58% had used a deposit limit.[10] Of the 190 deposit limit users, around three-quarters said the limit had stopped them making impulsive deposits and had helped them budget.[10] The same survey found 43% correctly understood a net deposit limit and 46% a gross one, which is the confusion the 30 September rules exist to clear up.[10]
An outcome test would throw most of that out. Feeling more in control is not a measured change in behaviour, and the Dutch account-level figures belong to the regulator’s own analysis rather than to anything an operator published about itself.
4. What would change inside the business?
The work would move out of the responsible gambling team’s policy library and into the data team’s backlog, and it would have to start before any rule arrived.
You cannot build a comparison group out of data you did not keep, and a matched-group test needs the pre-limit behaviour of both groups, the date and size of every limit set, changed or cancelled, and a record of which prompt the customer was looking at when they set it. The retention decision therefore has to be taken now rather than when a regulator asks.
Responsible gambling and product would stop being separate conversations, because a limit’s measured effect depends on where the prompt sits, what the default is and how hard the limit is to undo. The British rules already fix all three: limit-setting is presented as the default choice a customer has to actively decline, an increase carries a 24-hour cooling-off period, and a decrease takes effect immediately.[4]
Comparison across markets gets awkward quickly. An operator holding a German licence has a state-set €1,000 monthly ceiling sitting above whatever the customer chooses,[6] a Dutch licence brings mandatory operator contact above €350 a month and €150 for players aged 18 to 24,[8] and a British licence has neither, so the same tool produces different numbers for reasons that have nothing to do with how well it is run.
Honest measurement will sometimes produce an unflattering number. An operator that runs a proper test on a tool almost nobody uses will find out that the tool did nothing, and will then be holding a document it would rather not hand over. That is a reason to run the test early, while the finding is still yours to act on.
5. What are the likely outcomes?
- Mandatory defaults spread faster than proof requirements, because a default is cheap to legislate and an evaluation is not. More markets will copy the Dutch structure of a limit set at registration with a regulator-defined threshold above it, and say nothing at all about measurement.
- The obligation to produce proof arrives at regime level first. Germany reports by 31 December 2026 and Australia is working through a five-year evaluation, and in both cases what is being assessed is the rules rather than any one operator’s implementation of them.
- Operators that measure early get to argue about the remedy. If the German evaluation concludes that €1,000 is too high, the operators who hold their own figures on what happens at €1,000, €500 and €250 are the ones who will be listened to during the consultation.
- Self-report quietly loses its standing. Once a regulator has seen account-level outcomes from a market like the Netherlands, a survey finding that customers feel more in control stops being usable as evidence of anything.
Boardroom Questions
One piece of work makes all of this answerable, and it is not a policy review. Build a single evidence file per market, covering every responsible gambling tool you offer, holding five things: take-up as a share of active accounts; the measured change in deposits, net loss and session time over the 90 days after a tool is set, against a matched group of customers who did not set one; the share of customers who raise or remove the limit within 30 days; which prompt or default produced the setting; and the date the file was last refreshed. Most operators could produce the first line today and none of the rest.
Then put these to the board.
- Which of our responsible gambling tools can we show changed customer behaviour, using our own account data rather than a supplier’s claim or a customer survey?
- Are we keeping the data a matched-group test needs, and for how long, in every market where we hold a licence?
- Social responsibility code provision 3.4.3 already requires us to demonstrate the effectiveness of our customer interactions to the Gambling Commission. What did our last evaluation find, and would it hold up if someone read it looking for a reason to open a case?
- What share of our active accounts has a deposit limit set, and how does that sit against the 25% of British gamblers who have ever used a financial limit of any kind?
- If the German evaluation moves the €1,000 monthly ceiling down in December, what does that do to our German revenue, and do we have the numbers to say so during the consultation rather than after it?
- Who owns this measurement, the responsible gambling team or the data team, and is it in anyone’s objectives this year?
Sources
1. Gambling Commission, Licence conditions and codes of practice, social responsibility code provision 3.4.3, remote customer interaction, paragraphs 12 and 13, in force 12 September 2022. https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/lccp/condition/3-4-3-remote-customer-interaction
2. Gambling Commission, Customer interaction guidance for remote gambling licensees, formal guidance under SR code 3.4.3, Section D, Evaluate, requirement 13. https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/guidance/customer-interaction-guidance-for-remote-gambling-licensees-formal-guidance/requirement-13-customer-interaction-guidance-for-remote-gambling-licensees
3. Gambling Commission, Changes to customer-led tools: financial limits. The wording that the Commission encourages operators to monitor engagement with any prompts or alerts to understand their effectiveness. https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/blog/post/changes-to-customer-led-tools-financial-limits
4. Gambling Commission, Definition of deposit limits in the Remote gambling and software technical standards, Annex 2, RTS 12 wording in full from 30 September 2026. Requirements 12A to 12E, covering prominence, timeframes, the 24-hour cooling-off period on increases, immediate decreases, six-monthly review prompts and limit-setting as the default. https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/consultation-response/definition-of-deposit-limits-in-the-remote-gambling-and-software-technical/annex-2-rts-12-wording-in-full-from-30-september-2026
5. Gambling Commission, Implementation extension for new deposit limit requirements. The move of the second phase from 30 June 2026 to 30 September 2026 for further operator technical development time. https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/news/article/implementation-extension-for-new-deposit-limit-requirements
6. Gluecksspielaufsichtsbehoerden der Laender, Zwischenbericht zur Evaluation des Gluecksspielstaatsvertrags 2021, 31 January 2024, reporting the position as at 30 November 2023. The section 32 duty and the 31 December 2026 reporting date, the cross-operator monthly deposit limit, the Fachbeirat view that the ceiling is significantly too high, and the registered player figures behind the limit file. https://www.im.nrw/system/files/media/document/file/zwischenbericht-zur-evaluation-glustv-2021.pdf
7. Australian Institute of Family Studies for the Department of Social Services, National consumer protection framework for online wagering: baseline study, final report, November 2019. The ten measures, the survey of more than 5,000 online wagerers and the four-phase, five-year evaluation design. https://aifs.gov.au/research/commissioned-reports/national-consumer-protection-framework-online-wagering
8. Kansspelautoriteit, Tweede meting effecten nieuwe regels spelersbescherming, July 2025. Average monthly loss per account, the share of accounts losing more than €1,000 a month, threshold breaches, gross gambling revenue, channelisation and search volumes, drawn from pseudonymised data supplied by 29 licensed providers between July 2024 and May 2025. https://kansspelautoriteit.nl/sites/default/files/tweede_meting_effecten_nieuwe_regels_spelersbescherming_juli_2025.pdf
9. WODC and Ipsos I&O, Ervaringen met speellimieten bij online kansspelen, meting 2025, published 17 December 2025. Self-reported effects of money and time limits, support for mandatory limits in 2023 and 2025, and the self-control findings by risk group. https://www.wodc.nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/12/17/groeiend-draagvlak-voor-speellimieten-maar-ervaren-nut-blijft-achter
10. Gambling Commission and Yonder, Exploring consumer journeys using deposit limits, published 4 February 2025. Online survey of 1,019 adults in Great Britain who had gambled in the previous 12 months, fieldwork 10 to 12 June 2024. Take-up of financial limits, use of deposit limits, self-reported effects and comprehension of net and gross limits. https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/print/exploring-consumer-journeys-using-deposit-limitsake-up of financial limits, use of deposit limits, self-reported effects and comprehension of net and gross limits. https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/print/exploring-consumer-journeys-using-deposit-limits