Ransomware Threat Outlook 2025-2027 – Canadian Centre for Cyber Security

Summary

This Cyber Centre assessment updates Canada’s view of ransomware through to 2027. It describes ransomware’s evolution from early encryption-based schemes to today’s Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) ecosystem, highlights emerging tactics like multi-extortion and exfiltration-only attacks, and explains how technologies such as AI and cryptocurrency are shaping threat actor tradecraft. The report focuses on impacts to Canadian organisations (including critical infrastructure), key ransomware groups affecting Canada, national survey data, illustrative incident snapshots, common myths, mitigation advice, and an outlook for the next two years.

Key Points

Ransomware against Canadian targets is increasing and rapidly evolving; actors are almost certainly opportunistic and financially motivated.
RaaS and affiliate models have lowered technical barriers, increasing the number and sophistication of attacks.
Multi-extortion (encryption + data leaks + DDoS/third-party pressure) and exfiltration-only attacks are growing trends.
AI and large language models are very likely to be adopted by threat actors to automate malware, social engineering and negotiations, lowering skill thresholds.
Cryptocurrencies and obfuscation techniques (chain hopping, mixers, privacy coins) continue to facilitate cross-border laundering and complicate investigations.
No organisation is too small to be a target; MSPs and supply chains increase exposure for SMEs.
Basic cyber hygiene—patching, MFA, backups, phishing training—remains highly effective at reducing risk.
2024 saw a rise in incidents; Cyber Centre interventions (336 pre-ransomware notifications in 2024–25) reportedly saved up to CAD 18 million.
Top groups impacting Canada recently include Akira, Play and Medusa, which commonly use double extortion.
Reporting incidents to authorities and the Cyber Centre helps improve national detection and response capabilities.

Why should I read this?

Short version: if you run or rely on any organisation in Canada, this is worth five minutes. It tells you what’s actually happening (not scare stories), what tricks attackers are using now, and the simple things that stop most attacks. No jargon — just the threats, the trends and the actions that matter.

Author style

Punchy: this is an authoritative national-level brief. It’s essential reading for decision makers and security teams because it maps immediate threats to concrete mitigations. If you care about continuity, reputation or legal exposure, read the detail — the high-level takeaways are urgent but the nuanced recommendations are where you reduce real risk.

Content summary

The report opens with a concise executive summary and methodology, explains estimative language, and gives an accessible timeline of ransomware’s history (from 1989 Popp to WannaCry and Maze). It documents how RaaS and initial access brokers have professionalised cybercrime, and reviews key modern tactics: multi-extortion, exfiltration-only incidents, victim targeting shifts, AI-enabled techniques, and crypto-based laundering. Sector snapshots (public sector, private sector, retail, education, energy) illustrate operational impacts and recovery choices (pay or rebuild). The report debunks myths — e.g. ‘too small to be a target’ and ‘paying ransom guarantees recovery’ — and reiterates recommended controls and reporting routes.

Context and relevance

This is a timely, high-authority national assessment that aligns with broader trends: increasing ransomware incident rates, expanded criminal ecosystems, and tech-driven evolutions (AI, crypto). For organisations, it clarifies why basic hygiene remains critical even as attackers adopt advanced tools. For policymakers and responders, it frames where cooperation, reporting and international action are required to keep pace.

Practical actions mentioned

Implement and enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) across systems.
Keep systems and operational technology patched; enable automatic updates where practical.
Maintain offline and tested backups and recovery plans; practise incident response.
Train staff on phishing and suspicious links; validate credentials and vendor access.
Engage third-party security and monitor MSP relationships; limit overly broad access rights.
Report incidents to law enforcement, the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre and the Cyber Centre (My Cyber Portal or contact@cyber.gc.ca).